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Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to construct a model of economic growth
that is consistent with the growing :body of evidence on convergence. We want, in
particular, to explain gradual convergence in output and income per person while
allowing for an international credit market. that equates the real interest rates, across
economies. The key to our model is that capital is only partially mobile: borrowing
is possible to finance accumulation of physical capital but not accumulation of human
capital. We show that the assumption of .partial capital mobility, imbedded in an open-economy version of the neoclassical growth model, can explain the evidence on
convergence.
Perhaps the model in 'this paper is best applied not to countries or even states
but to families. The model may, in this context, be useful for explaining the
dynamics and distribution of wealth. It would predict that the most patient families
would tend to be the most highly educated and they would own most of the
economy's physical capital. Physical non-human wealth would be more highly
concentrated than human wealth.

Several recent studies have looked for evidence on convergence, defined here as the
tendency for poor economies to grow faster than rich economies. The clearest empirical
support for con:vergence comes from economies that,, except for initial conditions, appear -. similar. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) reported convergence for OECD countries. Barro
-- and Sala-i-Martin (1991b, 1991c) found that convergence occurred for the U.S. states
'.. and the regions of Europe and- Japan.at a·rate-of about ..2% per year_.--- .Moreover; for the--.,
U.S. states, state product per capita and state personal income per capita converged at
roughly the same rate.
The evidence from larger samples of countries is more controversial. Romer (1987)
·and Rebelo (1991 )'emphasized the lack of correlation between initial per capita GDP
, --and the subsequent per capita growth rate for a broad sample of about 100 countries.
They interpreted this finding as evidence against the convergence implications of the
- neoclassical growth model. .Yet an alternative interpretation is that these economies,
unlike the OECD countries and U.S. states, have substantially different steady states.
· These differences can reflect disparities in levels of technology, government policies that
amount to levels of technology, and preferences that affect the saving rate and fertility.
Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1990), and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) reported
that, after controlling for differences in rates of accumulation in human and physical
capital and some other variables, countries converge at a rate of about 2% per year.
Hence, if one allows for heterogeneity, all the data sets confirm that convergence is slow
but significant.
- Standard theories of economic-growth cannot easily explain this finding of
- convergence. Consider, for example, the neoclassical growth model with diminishing
returns to capital. As Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer; and Weil
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(1992) pointed out, this model can explain the observed rate of conditional convergence
if one assumes that these economies are . closed and that the capital share is about 0.8. A
capital share this large is reasonable if capital is viewed broadly to include human and._
physical components. (A more conventional capital share of around 0.3 implies much
faster convergence'than. that observed in:the.data.) Yet the.assumption of a closed ..
" economy is more· difficult to justify, especially when applied .tO' economies like ·the u~s;....
states. Interest rates are about the same in each state, and substantial borrowing and
lending seems to flow across state borders. If one assumes, however, that these
economies are open, then the neoclassical growth model implies that capital will move
quickly to equalize the marginal product of capital, implying instantaneous convergence
in output per worker.
Similarly, the usual endogenous growth models for closed economies cannot fully
account for the evidence. The one-sector, AK, model without diminishing returns can
explain differences in output per person without differences in real interest rates. But
this type of model is inconsistent with convergence if each economy has a fixed
technology parameter, A. Two-sector endogenous growth models can explain
convergence based on imbalances between physical and human capital (see Mulligan and
Sala-i-Martin [1991]). But real interest rates would differ across closed economies and
the imbalances would vanish instantaneously across open economies.
The main purpose of this paper is to construct a model of economic growth that is
consistent with the growing body of evidence on convergence. We want, in particular,
to explain gradual convergence in output and income per person while allowing for an
· international credit market that equates the real interest rates across economies. The
key to our model is that capital is only partially mobile: borrowing is possible to finance
accumulation of physical capital but not accumulation of human capital. We show that
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this assumption of partial capital mobility, imbedded in an open----€conomy version of the
neoclassical growth model, can explain the evidence on convergence.
The paper is organized,as follows. -Sectionih,presentsthe elements of the model.
Section II considers a closed economy, and Section III deals with an open economy with
perfect capital mobility. These two well-:c-known polar.cases provide useful.benchmar.ks
· ··'.fo:r·comparison:- ·section· IV1then,considern,partial.,capital. mobility;.in ,which.,borrowing., 0 .,
is possible to finance physical capital, but not human capital. Section V discusses the
quantitative relation between the theory and the empirical evidence, and Section VI
concludes.

I. The Model
Output is produced with three inputs: physical and human capital and a
nonreproducible factor, which we view as raw labor. We assume that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas:

where a>O, /3>0, a+,8<1, Y is output, K the stock of physical capital, H the stock of
human capital, L the quantity of raw labor, and A a fixed technology parameter. Raw
labor grows at the constant, exogenous rate n, and g is the constant, exogenous rate of
labor-augmenting technological progress. We assume a one-sector production
technology in which physical capital, human capital, and consumables are perfectly
substitutable uses of output. If we work as is customary in units of effective
labor-y:Y/Legt, k:K/Legt, h:H/Legt_then the production function is given in
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intensive form by

(1)

, Equation (1) implies that. the elasticity of substitution. between k and h is one.
, . W~ begin with,this assumption to keep the model as simple as possible.· This
assumption is not innocuous, however, and we examine later how the analysis differs
when we allow for different elasticities of substitution between the two capital stocks.
, The households own the three inputs and rent them to the firms at competitive
rental prices:~ Firms pay a proportional tax at rater on output. We interpret this tax
to include various elements that affect the incentives to accumulate capital; for example,
T

includes the risk of expropriation by the government, strong labor unions, or foreign

. inyaders. The.after-ta x cash flow for the representative firm is given in units of
effective labor by

(2)

where w is the wage rate, Rk is the rental price of physical capital, and Rh is the rental
price of human capital. In the absence of adjustment costs, the maximization of the
. present value of future cash flows is equivalent to the maximization of profit in each
period. The firm therefore equates the marginal products to the rental prices:

= (l~)aAka--l h,B =

(3a)

Rk

(3b)

Rh= (1~),BAkah,8-l = (1~),By/h

(3c)

w = (l~)Ak 0 h,B -Rkk - Rhh

(l~)ay/k
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Households are represented by the standard, infinitely-lived, Ramsey consumer
with preferences

(4)

where C is per capita ·consumption, p the subjective rate of time preference, and Othe
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Population, ent, corresponds to
the labor force.
The households own the physical and human capital and also have the net stock of
debt, d, per unit of effective labor. They receive income from wages and rentals and
spend this income on accumulation of physical capital, accumulation of human capital,
and consumption. Hence, the budget constraint is

where r is the real interest rate, c:Ce-gt, and a dot over a variable represents its time
derivative. This equation assumes that the relative prices of consumables, physical
capital, and human capital are always fixed at unity, and that physical and human
capital depreciate at the same rate, 6. We also assume that none of the taxes collected
are remitted to households, although our results would not change if these revenues
showed up as lump-sum transfers or as government services that did not interact with
the choices of consumption.
Households can borrow and lend at the real interest rate r on the domestic bond
market. In a closed economy, the debt, d, is zero for the representative household and r
is determined by the equilibrium of saving and investment at the national level. In an
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open economy, r is determined at the world level and d-the foreign debt per effective
worker--can be positive or negative.
To simplify the exposition, we integrate the,households and firms by substituting
the first-'Order conditions from· equation (3} into "the ,budget constraint cin equation (5) - - --- to get

(6)

h+k-<l

= (1--'r)Ako:h,B -

(6+n+g)(k+h ) - (r-n-g)d - c

Households maximize utility from equation (4) subject to equation (6), given k(.0)>0,
h(O)>O, and d(O). In the following sections, we consider this maximization problem
under environments that involve different degrees of capital mobility. These differences
entail various restrictions on the path of debt, d.

II. The Closed Economy
A. ~aws of Motion
The first environment is the closed economy, in which households can borrow and
lend on the domestic capital market at the rater, but cannot borrow or lend on
international markets. Hence, d=O, and the only difference from the standard Ramsey
model is that the technology involves two kinds of capital. The rate of return, r, must
equal the net returns on the two kinds of capital, Rk-8 and Rh-8, where the rental
prices are given in equations (3a) and (3b). These equations imply k/h
points in time. If the initial value of k/h differs from

= o:/,8 at all

a/ ,B, then households "jump" to

the desired ratio. Since we assume no adjustment costs or irreversibility constraints,
this jump is feasible, that is, households can convert excess human capital into physical
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equation (6) in
capital or vice versa. 1 We can then rewrite the budget constraint from
terms of a broad capital stock, z:k+h :

(7)

; = (1---T)Aza+,8 -

(6+n+ g)z - c

where A = Ao.a. /( o.+,8)-( o.+,8).
in the
The household's problem now corresponds to the standa rd formulation
[1965]), except
neoclassical growth model (Ramsey [1928], Cass (1965], and Koopmans
which
that the production function is less concave: the capital share is o.+,8,
ponds only to
·. corresponds to physical and human capital, rather than a, which corres
physical capital. Diminishing returns therefore set in more slowly.
The Euler equation characterizing the solution is familiar:

(8)

~Jc= (1/0)·[(1---T)A(o.+,B)zo.+,B-l -(6+p +0g)]

l, which also
where (1---T)A( o.+,B)zo.+,B-l is the after- tax marginal product of capita
describe the
equals r+6. Equations (7) and (8) and the transversality condition fully
transition of the economy toward the steady state.

B. The Steady State and the Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle.

The

is zero.
The stead y-stat e growth rate of the variables in units of effective labor
h, g, and the
per capita variables grow accordingly at the rate of productivity growt

, n+g. The
level variables grow at the rate of growth of population plus productivity
ons), then the
physical or human capital are irreversible (as is realistic in most situati
-good s models
model involves transitional dynamics of the sort described for two-c apital
in Mulligan and Sala- i-Mar tin (1991 ).
1If
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steady-state stock of broad capital in units of effective labor is given by

(9)

z* = [(1-1")A( a+/3)/(6+p+0g)] 1/ (l-a---,B)

Hence, z* is a decreasing function of p, 0, ,8; and r, and an increasing function of the
.• ,. level oftechnology, A. The breakdown:of broad capital into its.two components is given
in the steady state by

(10)

k*=z* a/( a+,B) and h*=z*,B/( a+,B)

This analysis for closed economies provides an interpretation of the Feldstein
Horioka (1980) puzzle about the strong correlation between saving and investment rates
across countries~•\Suppose that all countries have the same technology and preferences .....
and differ only in the level of the tax rate,

T,

which should be interpreted broadly to

include various disincentives to invest. The steady-state gross investment rate-for
physical and human capital--€quals the full depreciation rate, h'+n+g, times the ratio
of total capital to output, (z/y)*. Equation (8) implies that (z/y)* equals
(1-1")(o.+,B)/(8+p+0g). The steady-state investment and saving rates are therefore

(11)

(i/y)* = (1-1")(8+n+g)(o.+,B)/(8+p+0g)

Hence, closed economies with high tax rates-that is, high disincentives for
investment-have low steady-state investment and saving rates. The same result holds
in the standard formulation that treats expenditures on human capital as consumption.
The term, a+,B, in equation (11) is then replaced by a, and investment corresponds only
to the expenditures on physical capital.

9

Now consider the incipient capital movements. The steady-state real interest rate
is p+ 0g and is therefore independent of the tax rate. If economies differ only in their tax
rates, then the steady-state real interest rates are the same for all countries. Economies
with low steady-state capital intensities have high marginal products of .capital, but.
they also have high tax rates. The exact .offset ofthese two effects implies that the
after-tax.marginal products .of,capitaland.ther.efore,.the reaLinterest rates.are _
independent of the capital intensities. If we opened up international capital markets,
then capital would not flow across countries because the after-tax returns are already
equalized. Thus, investment and saving rates would be perfectly correlated across
countries even with full capital mobility.
Note that this potential resolution of the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle does not rely
on the existence of two capital goods, but applies also to the standard Ramsey model
and to a variety of other growth models. Heterogeneity in the incentives to accumulate
1

capital-measured here by a broad concept of the tax rate T--Can explain the positive
correlation between investment and saving rates without invoking imperfect
international capital markets.

C. Convergence during the Transition
The transitional dynamics of the model can be studied graphically using the
familiar phase diagram in. Figure 1. The c=O equation generates the modified golden
rule, and the z=O condition defines a hump-shaped curve,that reaches its maximum at
the golden-rule level of broad capital. The model displays saddle-path stability, and the
transversality condition ensures that the economy follows the saddle path during the
transition.
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To quantify the convergence implications of the model, we follow Barro and
Sala:.·--i--Martin (1992) and log-linearize the system, equations (7) and (8), around,the
steady state. The growth rate of y between times 0 and t can then be written as

(12)

*
1 -.At
(1/t)•{log[y(t)/y(O)]} = ( ~
)•{log[y /y(0)]}

That is, the growth rate is a negative function of initial income, y(0), after controlling
for the steady-state level of income, y*. The convergence rate, .X, is a complicated
function of the parameters of the model: 2

where

<.p

= p-n-(1-0)g > 0.

Equation (13) implies that the convergence rate, .X, depends inversely on the share
of qroad capital, o.+{J. If o.+/J=l (that is, if all inputs can be accumulated), then .X=0.
This outcome corresponds to the one-sector linear endogenous growth model of Rebelo
(1991). Another important property is that.Xis independent of the level of technology,
A, and the tax rate,

T.

It is instructive as a numerical example to plug in some figures that seem
approximately valid fo.r the U.S. economy: n=.01 per year, g=.02 per year, 8=.05 per
year, 0=2, p=.02 per year, o.=.3, and /J=.5. The rate of convergence implied by this
parameterization is .X=.014 per year. This value is at the low end of the range of
estimates of convergence coefficients from the empirical literature mentioned in the
introduction.

2This formula corresponds to the one derived in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), except
that the capital share is now o.+/J rather than o..
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The ratio of capital stocks, k/h, remains constant during the transition, but the
ratio ofeach stock to GDP, k/y and h/y,.rises as the economy approaches the steady
state. The steady increase in k/y conflicts with the view associated with Kaldor (1961)
that the capital-output ratio is virtually constant during the process of development. If

a.+/3 = .8, however, then diminishing returns set in slowly and the model predicts only
moderate changesin-k/y:;::iLkand lJ:..double, then,,kj,ytises--by.·1'5%., Since.k/y.is<not.,-: . "·. '
precisely constant empirically, the prediction of a slowly rising k/y cannot be considered
a serious shortcoming of the theory.
The theory also implies that the marginal products of physical and human capital,
and hence, the real interest rate, r, would decline over time. If

a.+ f3 = .8 and r begins at

8%, for example, then a doubling of k and h implies that r would fall to 6.9%. This slow
decline of the real interest rate-a reflection of the slow onset of diminishing
returns-does not conflict with empirical evidence.
The expression for A in equation (13) simplifies if, following Solow (1956), we
asrnme a constant gross saving rate. This assumption amounts to a restriction on the
parameters of the model (see Kurz [1968]). The gross saving rate is constant if

(14)

0 = (6+p)/[(o.+,6)(6+n)-g(l-o.-,6)]

and the corresponding gross saving rate is then

s = (l-r)/0

(15)

In this case, the accumulation constraint in equation (7) can be written as

(16)

.

z/z

-

= s(l-'T")Azo.+

(3-1

- (6+n+g)

..!

~

'.

-,~--· ;;~;•.
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and the steady-state capital intensity is

*_
z -

[sA (1-7)] l/(l-a-/3)
6+n+g

Equation (12)•·still provides.aJog-linear,approximation to the growth rate, but .the
convergence coefficient simplifies to

(17)

.A= (1---a-.B)(6+n+g)

which corresponds to the expression given in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). As
before, .X is a decreasing function of the capital share, o.+(3, and equals zero when
o.+/3=1. Also, .A is again independent of the level of technology, A, and the tax rate, 7.
If the parameters, ( a, (3,

o, p, n, g), take on the values assumed before and if 7=.3,

then equations (14) .and (15),imply that the gross saving rate is constant at the value
s=A4 if 0=1.59. Notethatthis high gross savingrate includes saving in human capital.
If we treat the expenditures on human capital as consumption, then the saving rate that

corresponds to physical capital is given by s • a/ (a+/3), which equals .17 for the
parameter values assumed before. Finally, we have to consider that only a fraction of
the expenditure on human capital appears in measured GDP: a significant portion
corresponds to foregone wages. If w~ accept Kendrick 1s (1976, Tables A-1 and B-2)
estimate that about one-half of spending on human ,capital. appears in GDP, then the
predicted saving rate that corresponds to physical capital becomes .23. This figure
corresponds well to observed ratios of physical investment to GDP. For the United
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States, for example, the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP averaged
.21 from 1960 to 1990. 3
Equation (1'7) implies:that A=.016 if the,gross saving rateis. constant. Thi.s value
accords with the range of estimates for convergence coefficients found in the empirical
studies cited in the introduction.
The major deficiency of this model is:the assumption.oLaclosed economy, ·.an ,.. - · · ·
assumption that is especially unappealing .for the U.S. states and the regions of
European countries. Therefore, we now extend the analysis to allow for capital mobility
across economies.

III. The Open Economy with Perfect Capital Mobility
Suppose now that households can borrow and lend at the going interest rate on
world capital· markets. We assume,that the country is smallrelativeto the rest of the
world and faces a constant world real interest rate, rw, which pegs the domestic rate, r. 4
., The rate rw would be constant if:theworld werein the kind oLsteady state that we
described above for a closed economy. Goods are tradable internationally, but labor
cannot migrate.
The interest rate, r, again equals the net returns on the two kinds of capital, Rk-8
and Rh-8, where the rental prices are given in equations (3a) and (3b). But since r=rw,
ratio was computed from data in Citibase, defining gross investment to include
public investment for non-,military and military purposes. The average.ratio for private
investment only is .17. We may also want to add consumer-durables purchases, which
averaged 8% of GDP from 1960 to 1990. A further small adjustment would modify
GDP to include the service flows from government capital (to the extent that these
flows were not already reflected in private output) and consumer durables.
3The

•'( .4As..in Barro and Sala~i-Martin (1991b, chapter 2); we assume.rw>;g+n, a. condition that
ensures that the present value of future wages is bounded. ·Strictly speaking, the smallcountry assumption also requires rw~p+0g; otherwise, the country's assets and
consumption will grow faster than the world's, and the country will eventually not be
small.
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a constant, the implied values of k and h-and hence, y-are also constant. In other
words, the model predicts that a small open economy will jump instantaneously to its
steady-state levels of output, physical capital, and human capital per effective worker
and will remain there forever. The predicted rates of convergence for output and capital
are infinite, a result that conflicts sharply with the empirical evidence discussed earlier.
We could eliminate t-he'i-nfinite<speeds 'of,convergence·'by introdttcing··adjustment•eost-s- .,,, ..,,.~~,N.. ·
and irreversibility conditions for physical and human capital. Plausible modifications
along these lines do not, however, eliminate the counterfactual prediction that
.· convergence rates would be rapid in an open economy with perfect capital mobility. 5
We:therefore,nowturn,to..,amodel that,,allows for imperfect capital mobility.

IV. The Open Economy with Partial Capital Mobility

A. Laws of Motion.
We now assume that the amount of debt, d, cannot exceed the quantity of physical
capital, k. This assumption introduces an asymmetry between the two capital stocks: k
can be used as collateral for international borrowing whereas h cannot. 6 We are
assuming implicitly that domestic residents own the physical capital stock but may
obtain part or all of the financing for this stock by issuing bonds to foreigners. The
results would be the same if we allowed for direct foreign investment, in which case the
5The model has other unappealing implications.· As first conjectured by
Ramsey (1928),
if countries differ in their discount rates, p, then the most patient country
asymptotically owns all the assets in the world, including all claims on human capital
and raw labor. For the rest of the countries, c approaches zero, and the debt eventually
mortgages all domestic capital and raw labor. The model also predicts,
counterfactually, that GDP would typically behave very differently from GNP.
6Cohen and Sachs (1984) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991b,
chapter 2) examine a
-.. modelcwith one capital good in which the borrowing constraint;amounts to d~vk, where
O~~l. In other words, only the fraction v ofcapital serves as collateral. The model
considered in the text differs in that k and h are imperfect substitutes as inputs to
production, and the choices between k and h determine the fraction of broad capital,
k+h, that constitutes collateral.
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foreigners would own part of the physical capital stock rather than bonds. The
· important assumption is that domestic residents cannot borrow with human capital or
rawlabortas collateral and that foreigners cannot own domestic human capital or raw
labor. We are, in particular, ruling out any international migration of labor.
There are various ways to motivate.the borrowing .constraint. Physical capitalis .
·· more easily repossessed than human •capital and-is therefore morereadily· financed• with•
debt. Physical capital is also more amenable to direct foreign investment: a person can
own a factory but not someone else's stream of labor income. Finally, one can abandon
the terms, "physical capital" and "human capital," and recognize that not all
investments can be financed through perfect capital markets. The key distinction
between k and h is not the physical nature of the capital but whether the cumulated
goods serve as collateral for borrowing on world markets.
We still assume that the world interest rate, rw, fa constant.at its steady-state
value. We assume also that rw = p+Bg, the steady-state interest rate that would apply
· if the domestic economy were closed. That is, the home economy is neither more nor
less impatient than the world as a whole. The initial quantity of assets per effective
worker is k(0)+h(0)-d(0), and the key consideration is whether this quantity is greater
or less than the steady-state amount of human capital, h*. If k(0)+h(0)-d(0)~h*, then
the borrowing constraint is not binding and the economy jumps to the steady-state
values of k, h, and y. In contrast, if k(0)+h(0)-d(0)<h*, then the constraint is
binding-that is, d=k applies-and we obtain some new results. We therefore focus on
this situation. 1

7If rw<p+Bg, then the domestic economy must eventually become constrained on the
· world credit market. Hence, our analysis of a debt-constrained economy applies at
some time in the future even if not at the initial date. If rw> p+ Bg, then the assumption
of a small economy is violated eventually, and rw would have to change (seen. 4).
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Since physical capital serves as collateral, the net return, Rk-6, on this capital still
equals the world interest .rate, rw, at all points in .time.. The formula for Rk from
equation (3a) therefore implies

(18)

Equation (18) ensures that the ratio of physical capital to GDP, k/y, will be constant
throughout the transition to the steady state. In contrast, k/y rose steadily during the
transition for the closed economy that we considered earlier. (The ratio of human
· capital.to GDP;:'ltfy;► roseover time for the closed economy and will turn out still to rise
for the open economy.) We mentioned before that the rough constancy over time of k/y
is one of Kaldor 1s (1961) stylized facts about economic development. (Maddison (1980)
provides some confirmation ofthis regularity:). The consistency of the credit-constrainedu
open-economy model with this 11 fact 11 is therefore notable. s
The resultfor k from equation (18) can,.be combined with the production function,
y

~ Ak 0 h.B, to express y as a function of h:
(19)

where B

y

=Al/(l-o.)[(1-----r)o./(rw+b')]o./(l-o.) and c =,B/(1-o.) are constants.

The

condition O < o.+,B < 1 implies O < t < a+,B <l. Thus, the reduced-form production

8The

precise constancy of k/y in our model depends on the fixity of the world interest
rate, rw, and on the assumption that the production function is Cobb-Douglas. This
production function implies that the average product of capital, y /k, is proportional to
·· the marginal product. Since the marginal product of capital, net ofdepreciation and
taxes, equals the fixed world interest rate, rw, the average product, y/k, must be
constant. In the analysis considered later, which departs from a Cobb-Douglas
technology, the ratio y /k is not precisely constant along the transition path.
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function in equation (19) expresses y as a function of h with positive and diminishing
.,marginal.product. The convergenceimpli,cations.ofthis,.model are.therefore.similar .to .. · • ,: . ,.,..
those of the closed economy -both models involve the accumulation of a capital stock
under conditions of diminishing returns.
The budget constraint from equation (6) can,be combined with the. reduced-form
production functionfrom equation (19), theborrowjng..constraint, d=k,.and.t he
condition, (rw+6)k = (1-r)ay from equation (18), to get the revised budget constraint:

(20)

h=

(1-a)(l-'T")Bh€ -(6+n+g )h- c

Note that the term, -a(l-'1")Bh€ = -a(l-r)y, corresponds to the flow of rental
payments on physical capital, (rw+8)k (see equation [18]). Since d~k, this term equals
the net factor payments from abroad and therefore equals the difference between GNP
and GDP. GDP exceeds GNP because the country is constrained.on theinterna tionaL.
cre<;lit market and therefore has the positive foreign debt, d=k.
Households now maximize utility from equation (4) subject to the budget
constraint in equation (20) and a given initial stock of human capital, h(0)>0. (The
initial value h(0) equals the given amount of initial assets, which was assumed to be less
than h *.) The Euler equation is

where (1-r)(l-a) B Eh E-l = (1-r)B,BhE -l is the after-tax marginal product of human
capital.. Equations (20) and (21) and the transversality condition fully describe the
transitional dynamics of this model.
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Because we assumed rw=p+0g, the steady .state is the same as that for the closed
economy. Jn particular,h"'=z"'/3/(a+/3), as in equation (10)., where z* is the steady-state _
quantity of broad capital for the closed economy, given in equation {9). Hence, the
opportunity to borrow on the world credit market does not influence the steady state,
but- will turn out to affect the speed ofconvergence. 9

B. Convergence Along the Transition.
The system described by equations (20) and (21) and the transversality condition
has the usual saddle-path characteristics. Compare the debt-constrained open economy
,-. -·

,withthe-closed economy: equation (20) corresponds to equation (7) and equation (21)
-to equation (8) .. The only differences are that equation (20) contains (1-a)B as a
proportional constant in the production function, whereas equation (7) has A; the
capital-stock variable is h rather than z:h+k; and the exponent on the capital stock is
c=/3/(1-a.) rather than a.+{3. Since c and a.+/3 are positive and less than one-that is,
both models feature diminishing returns-the dynamics of the models are essentially the
same.
Equation (13) determines the convergence coefficient, .X, for the closed economy.
The only difference in the credit-constrained open economy is that a.+{3 has to be
replaced by c=/3/(1-a.). (Recall that the level of the production technology does not
influence the rate of convergence.) Hence, the convergence coefficient for the log
linearized version of the credit-constrained open economy is given by

9If

we had assumed rw<p+ 0g-so that the home economy is more impatient than the
rest of the world (seen. 7)-then the availability of foreign borrowing would also affect
the steady-state position. The open economy would have higher steady-state capital
intensities, h* and k*, than the closed economy.
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where cp is again equal to p-n-(1-0)g > 0. The coefficient determined from equation
(22) is the same value that would arise inadosed economrthat had the broad capital
share E, rather than o.+/3. Since E=/3/(1-o.), it follows that E<o.+/3 (using the condition,

o.+/3<1). The credit-constrained open economy therefore .works like a closed economy
with a broad capital share that is less than a.+/3. , Recall that. the rate of convergence
,depends inversely on the capit-al share-{because a smallercapital share means-that
diminishing returns set in more rapidly). The credit-constraine d open economy
therefore has a higher rate of convergence than the closed economy. Note, however, that

(o.+/3)-+1 implies E-+1 and therefore,

..x-o in equation (22).

Thus, if diminishing returns

•to broad capital do not apply ( o.+/3 = 1), then the model still does not exhibit the
-convergence property .10
The credit-constraine d open economy converges faster than the closed economy,
...butithe. speed of.convergencejs,.now finite,for .the .open economy,,: and the difference from:, .
the closed economy is not large for plausible parameter values. If we use the values for

(a, f},

o, p, g, n) mentioned before along with 0=2, then the convergence coefficient

. implied by equation (22) is .022, compared with .014 for the closed economy. In
particular, the value .022 accords well with the empirical estimates of convergence
coefficients for open economies, such as the U.S. states and the regions of some western
European countries and Japan.
Recall that an open economy with perfect capital mobility converges at an infinite
rate. Therefore, our finding is that an open economy with partial capital mobility looks
much more like a closed economy than a fully open economy. Although we derived this
. result so far only for a particular set of parameter values, the conclusion is much more

10 If

o.=0, so that no capital constitutes collateral, then E=f} and ,\ from equation (22)
corresponds to the value from equation (13) for a closed economy (with o.=0). If fJ=0,
so that all capital serves as collateral, then E=0 and ,\ from equation (22) becomes
infinite, as in the open economy with perfect capital mobility.
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general. As we show in the next section, the predicted convergence coefficient for a
,partially open economy•falls within the range ofempiric al.estimat es--rough ly .015 to
.035 per year-for a wide range of "reasonable" parameter values.
The transition to the steady state involves a monotonic increase in human capital
per effective worker, h, from its initial, value, h(O), to,its steady:-state value, h*.
Equation (19) implies that the growth rate of y is

E times

the growth rate of h,·where

E

is between zero and one. The ratio, h/y, therefore rises steadily during the transition.
Recall, however, that equation (18) implies that the ratio, k/y, is constant throughout.
Therefore, k grows at the same rate as y and the ratio of human to physical capital, h/k,
. .increases during the transition. Note that, although physical capital serves fully as
collateral,,k nevertheless rises gradually toward its steady-sta te value, k*. The reason
is the constraint of domestic saving on the accumulation of human capital and the
'complementarity between h and kin, the production function. When h is low the
schedule for the marginal product of physical capital is low; hence, k<k* follows even
though domestic producers can finance all acquisitions of physical capital with foreign
borrowing. ·The gradual increase of human capital impacts positively on the marginal
product of physical capital and leads thereby to an expansion of k.
Foreign borrowing occurs only on loans secured by physical capital, and the
interest rate on these loans is pegged at the world rate, rw. We can also imagine a
domestic credit market, although the setting with a representative domestic agent
always ends up with a zero volume of borrowing on this market. For loans that are
secured by physical capital, the shadow interest rate on the domestic market must also
be rw. If we assume that human capital and raw labor do not serve domestically as
collateral, then the shadow interest rate on the domestic market with these forms of
security is infinity (or at least high enough to drive desired borrowing to zero), just as it
is on the world market.
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We might assume instead that human capital and raw labor serve as collateral for
. :- domestic borrowing but not for foreign borrowing. This.situation would apply if the
legal system enforces loan contracts based on labor income when the creditor is
domestic, but not when the creditor is foreign. 11 In this case, the shadow interest rate
on domestic lending, collateralized by labor income,equals the•net-marginal·produet·of •·· ·
human capital. This net marginal product begins at a relatively high value
(corresponding to the low starting stock, h[0]) and then falls gradually toward the
steady-state value, rw. Thus, the transition features a decrease in the spread between
this kind of domestic interest rate and the world rate, rw. An example would be the
· curb market forinformahlending in Korea (see:Collins and Park [1989, p. 353]). The
..• spread betweencu rb-market interest rates and world interest rates was 30--40
percentage points in the 1960s and 1970s, but fell by the mid 1980s to about 15
percentage points.
We can again simplify the formula for the rate of convergence if we assume a
. constant gross saving rate. The required value of 0 for a constant gross saving rate is
now

(23)

and the corresponding gross saving rate (expressed relative to GNP) is s

= (1-r)/fr'.

The rate of convergence is then

.11Ifthe foreign. loans are made directly to the domestic government, .then the collateral
·cinvolves the security put up by the government. Domestic physical capital may then
also not serve well as collateral on foreign loans-if the home government does not force
itself to pay up-althou gh it may work better on domestic loans (if the government
enforces private loan contracts on the domestic market with physical capital as
collateral).
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(24)

>.

= (1-€)(6+n+g)

For the parameters used before, fr = 1.9, s = .37, and>. = .023.
Another interesting implication of this model is that, despite the existence of
international borrowing and lending, the convergence properties of gross national
product and gross domestic.productare the same. As.noted,before, the net·factor
income from abroad is -(rw+.i)k

(25)

= -(1-r)ay.

GNP (per unit of effective labor)

Therefore,

= y -(1-r)ay = y[l-a(l-r) ]

Since GNP is proportional to GDP, which corresponds toy, the convergence rates for
GNP and GDP are the same. This result suggests that data sets that involve GDP are
likely to generate similar rates of convergence as those that involve GNP or measures of
national income. Some confirmation of this prediction comes from the study of the U.S.
states by Barro and Sala-i-Ma rtin (1991a): the rates of convergence are similar for
gross state product per capita and state personal income per capita.
The model implies that the gap between GDP and GNP would be large for a
credit-constrained open economy: roughly 20% of GDP for the parameter values ( a=.3,

r=.3) assumed before. The current-account deficit, which equals the change in physical
capital, is correspondingly large. It equals 15% of GDP in the steady state for the
parameters assumed before.

It is unusual to find developing countries that have values this high for the
GDP-GN P gap and the current-account deficit. 12 We can reconcile the theory with
this observation by noting first, that many developing countries are insufficiently

12One

counter-example is Singapore: its current-account deficit was between 10 and 20%
of GDP throughout the 1970s (see International Financial Statistics, Yearbook, 1991).
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productive to be credit constrained, and second, that the collateral for international debt
may be substantially narrower than physical capital. If the coefficient a were less than
.3, then the predicted ratios for the GDP-GNP gap and the current-acco unt deficit
would be correspondingly smaller.

. "' V. Elasticity ofSubstituti on between.Capital,Stocks
The levels of k and h determine the fraction of capital that serves as collateral-a
higher fraction means that the economy is more open and therefore converges more
rapidly to its steady-state position. The choice between k and h depends on how these
two forms 0Lcapital interact as:inputs into the production function. We have assumed
1

thus far that the production possibilities are Cobb-Douglas so that the elasticity of
substitution between k and h is unity. If the two types of capital are more or less
.substitutable in the production function, then the chosen values of k and h and therefore
the model's convergence properties will differ from those found before. We illustrate
this behavior by generalizing to a CES production function.
The production function for output per worker is now

(25)

y = f(k,h) = A{a(bk/P + (1-a)[(l-b)h]1P}7J/'lj;

where 0<7]<1, O<a<l, O<b<l, -m<7/J<l, and the magnitude of the elasticity of
substitution between k and his 1/(1-7/J). The parameter 7J is the share of broad capital
in output. 13 The parameters, a and b, determine how the steady-state share of physical
13 The

production function for the level of output can be written as
Y

= Az1l1 l-7]

where Z is a broad measure of capital, given by
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capital, K=k* /(k*+h*), changes as the substitution parameter, 1/J, varies between

cl)

and 1.
As 'I/>-+ cD,. the production function approaches fixed proportions, y = A• MIN[bk,
(1-b)h], and

x;

approaches 1-b. For 1/J=O, the production function becomes

Cobb-Douglas with x;=a. (Theparameters, inequation,(1} are a=a17 and·.B=(l-a)17.} ·
As 1/>-+l, kand h become perfect substitut"€s~ The economy uses only 'One of the capital
inputs in the steady state, depending on which is more productive. (Recall that k and h
substitute one-for-one in the output stream.) If a+b>l, then the economy specializes
asymptotically ink and x;-!(I), whereas if a+b<l, then the economy specializes
asymptotically in hand x;--10; (Ifa+b=l, then x;--11/2.) 14 We can reduce the number of
independent,parameters by one by rewriting equation (25) as

(26)

y = f(k,h) = A1[a 1k"P + (1-a')h~TJ/1/J

where A'= A(ab"P+(l-a)(l-b)~TJ/1/J and a'= ab"P/[ab"P+(l-a )(l-b)~. In equation
{26), however, the parameters A' and a' vary as 1/J changes.
The household budget constraint, analogous to equation (6), now generalizes to

h+k-d = (1-T)f(k,h) - (S+n+g)(k+h) - (r-n-g)d - c

The elasticity of substitution between Z and L is still assumed to be one.
14These

results depend .on the condition, rw = p+ 0g. in this case, the home economy is
. unconstrained on the credit market in the steady state, and .hence, the potential to use k
as collateral imparts no asymptotic advantage to kover h. ·As 1/>-+1, the economy
therefore specializes in the steady state in the form of capital that is more productive. If
rw < p+0g, then k's usage as collateral imparts an asymptotic advantage. As 1/>-+1, the
economy then specializes ink in the steady state even if a+b is somewhat less than 1.
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We consider again a credit-constrained economy for which d=k applies and the world
interest rate equals the constant rw. The budget constraint then simplifies to

h=

(1-r)f(k, h) -(rw+o) k - (o+n+g) h - c

Since k serves as collateral on the world credit market, we have

(27)

where fk is ,the marginal product of k, which can be calculated from equation (26). The
· •budget constraint therefore becomes1s

(28)

h = (1-r)[f(k,h) - fkk] - ( o+n+g)h - c

The Euler equation is

(29)

c/c = (1/0)((1- r)fh -(o+p+0g)]

where fh is the marginal product of h, which can be computed from equation (26).
Equation (29) generalizes equation (21).

If we use the partial derivatives computed from equation (26) to substitut e out for
fk and fh, then equations (27)-(29) define a dynamic system of equations ink, h, and c.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, it was easy to eliminate k and then deal with the dynamic
15 In

the Cobb-Douglas case, fk is the fraction a of the average product, f(k,h)/k, and the
term in brackets in equation (28) simplifies to (1-a)•f(k ,h) (see equation (20]). This
simplification does not work with a CES technology.
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system in terms of h and c. In the CES case, it is possible to use equation (27) to
express has a function ofk and.then eliminate h from the three--€quation system. Then
. we end up with a non-linear system ink and c. We can use a log-linear expansion of
this system around the steady state to study convergence.
We continue to use the parameter values: 17=.8, n=.01 per year, g=.02 per year,

8 .05 peryear, 0=2, and p=.02'per year;· vWe,also assume iw=p+Og:..:.::06 per year,.16
The convergence coefficient, .>i, then depends on the substitutio n parameter, 7/J, and the
capital-share parameter, a'. The results are clearer if we replace a' by the implied
steady-state share of .physical capital:

(30)

_* *

K

* _

= k /(k +h ) -

(a')l/(1-7/ J)
1/(1-¢)
1/ (1-¢)
(a')
+ (1-a')

Figure 2 shows the convergence coefficient, .>i, as a function of K. Each curve
corresponds to a particular value of 7/J, ranging from -9 to .9 (elasticity of substitution·
between .1 and 10). The curve associated with

'1/J=O corresponds to our earlier model

with a Cobb-Douglas production function. A shift in 7/J, for a given value of K, implies a
compensating change in a' in accordance with equation (30).
For any value of 7/J, .>i approaches the closed-economy value, .014, as K--10, and the
fully open-economy value,

co,

as

K-+l.

For the Cobb-Douglas case,

'1/J=O, >irises from

.014 at K=O to .022 at K=.375 (the value that corresponds to the parameters that we
used,before) and to :027 at K=.5. The value ofXreache s .04 at K=.68, .05 at K=.76, and
.06 at K=.81. Thus, if the share of capital that constitutes collateral is less than .5, then
.>i is confined to the narrow range of .014 to .027.

16 In

the Cobb-Douglas case, the convergence coefficient, )., in equation (22) is
independent of rw. That independence does not hold generally in the CES case.
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If k and h are highly substitutable, say

1/J=. 75, then ,X again equals .014 at K=0,

:-but stays below the Cobb-Douglas value as Kincreases. ff K< '.5, then X ranges -between
.014 and .021.
If k and h exhibit little substitution, say

1/J= -9, then ,X is above the Cobb-Douglas

value for K>0.17 The value of ,X varies in,thiscase.,;between -.014 .and. ;030if K<.5 . .,
, The main message from Figure 2 isthat'the fulLrange of variation·inthe···
substitution parameter

'1/J

leaves the convergence coefficient, .X, confined to a remarkably

narrow range-.014 to .030-if K<.5 applies. Hence, the theoretical value of ,X for a
partially open economy conforms to the range of empirical estimates unless the steady
state share of broad capital that serves as collateral is well above .5. Given the
importance .ofhuman capital in the production process and the difficulties in using
human capital as collateral, we are comfortable with the assumption K<.5.
The effects on .X oLthe other technology and preference parameters work as they
did in the closed-economy case, discussed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991a). The
main results are.that ,X rises if r, (the share of broad capital) falls, if 0 falls (so that
people are more willing to substitute intertemporally), and if orises. If we assume our
standard values for the other parameters, then it takes extreme shifts in 0 or

oto move

.X outside of the range, ( .014, .030), mentioned above. Table 1 shows, for example, that
if K=.3 and

1/J=0

(Cobb-Douglas production function), then -X=.020 at the baseline

specification, where r,=.8, 0=2, and

o

.05. The value of ,X rises to .035 if 0 falls to .5

and declines to .010 if 0 increases to 10. Similarly, ,X rises to .030 if

oincreases to .10

and falls to .016 if odeclines to .03.
The coefficient ,X is more sensitive to variations in T/, the broad capital share.
Table 1 shows that .X rises to .047 if r, increases to .6 and falls to .009.if r, rises to .9.
17As '1/>-+-w, the model approaches the framework described in·n.6 in which there is only
one type of capital, and people can borrow up to the fraction v of this capital. The share
of capital that constitutes collateral, K, equals v in this case.
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The empirical finding that ,X is in the range of roughly .015 to .030 requires T/ to lie in
the narrow range between .70 and .85 ifthe,otherpa rameters are set at their baseline·
values. If 0=10 and 8-.03, then a value of T/ as low as .55 is consistent with the
empirical estimates of .X, whereas if 0=0.5 and 8=.10, then T/ can be as high as .95.

VI. Conclusion
Economists have long known that capital mobility tends to raise the rate at which
poor and rich economies converge. The main message of this paper is that the
quantitative impact of this effect is likely to be small. If there are some types of capital,
such as human capital, that cannot be financed by borrowing on world markets, then
,. open economies wilLconverge only somewhat faster than closed economies. This
prediction is consistent with the empirical literature, which finds that samples of open
economies,such as the U.S. states, converge only slightly faster than samples of.more ··.
closed economies, such as the OECD countries.
We have assumed throughout that-economies can be modeled by a representative
consumer. If capital-market imperfections of the sort considered here are important,
however, then this assumption may cause problems: the credit constraints would
influence households in different ways. At any time, some households would face
binding borrowing constraints, whereas others would not.
Perhaps the model in this paper is best applied not to countries or even to states
but to families. The model may, in this context, be useful for explaining the. dynamics .
and distribution of wealth. Suppose, for example, that all families were described by the
· model in this paper and that they differed only by their rate of time preference. In
steady state, the time preference of the most patient families would determine the
interest rate; these families would be the most highly educated, and they would own all
the economy's physical capital. The less patient families would face binding borrowing
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constraints, and they would own no physical capital. Although these families would
save to accumulate human.capital, they would have a lower level of human capital than
the more patient families. Thus, in this economy, we would observe a positive
correlation between ownership of human and non'-human wealth.· ·We would ·also see a
highly concentrated. distribution of non-human wealth and a more diffuse distribution of
human wealth. These predictions seem.consistent'with the facts:
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Table 1
Effects of Parameters on Convergence Coefficient

;

T/

0

8

,x

.8

2.0

.05

.020

.6
.9

2.0
2.0

.05
.05

.047
.009

.8
.8

0.5
10.0

.05
.05

.035
.010

.8
.8

2.0
2.0

.10
.03

.030
.016

.8
.8

0.5
10.0

.10
.03

.056
.009

Note: The table shows the convergence coefficient, -X, that corresponds to the specified
values of 1J, 0, and 8. The other parameters are K=.3, 1/J=O, p=.02, g=.02, and n=.01.

Figure 1: Phase Diagram
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